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The Cost of Denied Observation in Multiagent Submodular Optimization
David Grimsman, Joshua H. Seaton, Jason R. Marden, and Philip N. Brown
Abstract—A popular formalism for multiagent control ap-
plies tools from game theory, casting a multiagent decision
problem as a cooperation-style game in which individual agents
make local choices to optimize their own local utility functions
in response to the observable choices made by other agents.
When the system-level objective is submodular maximization,
it is known that if every agent can observe the action choice
of all other agents, then all Nash equilibria of a large class of
resulting games are within a factor of 2 of optimal; that is,
the price of anarchy is 1/2. However, little is known if agents
cannot observe the action choices of other relevant agents. To
study this, we extend the standard game-theoretic model to
one in which a subset of agents either become blind (unable to
observe others’ choices) or isolated (blind, and also invisible to
other agents), and we prove exact expressions for the price of
anarchy as a function of the number of compromised agents.
When k agents are compromised (in any combination of blind
or isolated), we show that the price of anarchy for a large class
of utility functions is exactly 1/(2 + k). We then show that if
agents use marginal-cost utility functions and at least 1 of the
compromised agents is blind (rather than isolated), the price
of anarchy improves to 1/(1 + k). We also provide simulation
results demonstrating the effects of these observation denials
in a dynamic setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game-theoretic design methods for distributed control
of multiagent systems have received considerable attention
in recent years, with applications ranging from distributed
power generation, swarming of autonomous vehicles, net-
work routing, smart grids, and more [1]–[5]. One common
game-theoretic approach involves modeling the agents in a
multiagent system as players in a cooperation-style game,
designing utility functions for these players and program-
ming the players with a distributed algorithm with which to
individually optimize their utility functions [6], [7]. Provided
that the designed utility functions and algorithms are selected
appropriately, quality and convergence guarantees can then
be inherited from the broader game theory literature [8]–
[13]. One of the strengths of this approach is its modularity,
as agent utility functions can typically be designed inde-
pendently from distributed algorithms: the utility functions
govern the quality of the resulting emergent behavior, and
the algorithms govern dynamics and convergence.
The above game-theoretic approach has offered a multi-
tude of attractive theoretical guarantees; an early example of
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this applies to the class of multiagent systems in which the
agents are designed to be maximizing a submodular function;
that is, one that exhibits decreasing marginal returns [14].
Here, the submodularity of the system objective function
can be leveraged in combination with a wide variety of
utility function designs (yielding the class of so-called valid
utility games) to ensure that all Nash equilibria are within a
factor of 2 of optimal; i.e., the price of anarchy is 1/2 [15].
These types of results have a great deal of synergy with
the broader literature on submodular maximization, with
broad applications in diverse areas such as information
gathering [16], influence in social networks [17], object
detection [18], leader selection in multiagent systems [19],
and document summarization [20], among others.
Following from the initial successes of this game-theoretic
methodology, recent work has begun to critically investigate
the robustness properties of this approach. For instance,
it has been shown that in general settings, slight changes
to agent utility functions can lead to dramatic changes
in the quality of emergent behavior [21], and that faulty
or misbehaving agents can easily lead stochastic learning
dynamics astray [22]. While a comprehensive measure of
robustness for such systems remains elusive, positive results
exist as well. In particular, for submodular maximization, it
is known that performance guarantees can be quite robust to
discrepancies of information availability among the agents
when the agents are endowed with the specific marginal-
contribution utility function [23]–[25]. Specifically, these pa-
pers show that the price of anarchy associated with marginal-
cost utility functions degrades gracefully as information is
denied to agents. While attractive, these preliminary positive
robustness results are limited in scope as they consider
only the specific marginal-contribution agent utility function,
despite the fact that this is only one possible choice of utility
design and is not optimal in all settings [26]–[28].
Accordingly, this paper initiates a study on the robustness
of performance guarantees for the broad class of valid utility
games when agent actions are not observable by all agents.
In our model, we study valid utility games in which a
set of k agents is compromised either by becoming blind
(unable to observe the action choices of any other agent,
but still observable by others) or becoming isolated (unable
to observe other agents or be observed by other agents).
Our main result in Theorem 1 states that the price of
anarchy when k agents are compromised is 1/(2 + k), and
that this bound is tight for any combination of blind or
isolated agents. This result is significant in at least two
dimensions: first, it shows for general valid utility games
that, in line with the narrower characterization of earlier
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work [23]–[25], performance guarantees degrade gracefully
as information is denied from agents. Second, and perhaps
more surprisingly, Theorem 1 illustrates that isolation is no
worse than blindness. Intuitively, this suggest that if an agent
is blind, it might as well be invisible also.
This raises the question: are blindness and isolation equiv-
alent for all forms of utility functions for the agents? Our
Theorem 2 answers this in the negative, showing that if the
non-compromised agents are endowed with the marginal-
contribution utility function, isolation has a cost: the price of
anarchy resulting when k agents are compromised improves
if some of the compromised agents are not isolated. Specifi-
cally, if at least 1 of the k compromised agents is blind (but
not isolated), then the price of anarchy improves to 1/(1+k).
Thus, Theorem 2 also demonstrates graceful degradation
of performance guarantees, and in addition shows that for
some utility function designs, blindness can indeed be strictly
better than isolation.
As a simple benchmark to illustrate the quality of the
above price of anarchy guarantees, we also show that for
any utility design, if even one agent is disabled (i.e., cannot
contribute any value to the system), the price of anarchy is 0
– showing that in multiagent coordination, it is considerably
better for an agent to be blind or isolated and otherwise
operational than to be dead.
Finally, the paper closes with a set of simulations which
partially investigate the stability of the worst-case equilibria
associated with the paper’s price of anarchy bounds. These
simulations endow agents with stochastic learning dynamics,
and show at least in worst-case examples, these low-quality
equilibria can be disrupted by the addition of small amounts
of noise.
A. Model Preliminaries
A submodular multiagent optimization problem has agent
set N = {1, . . . , n} and a finite set of resources R. Each
agent i ∈ N has a set of admissible actions given by subsets
of resources: Ai ⊆ 2R and denote the joint action space by
A := A1×· · ·×An. For convenience, we assume that every
agent can opt out by selecting the empty set, or ∅ ∈ Ai.
The overarching goal is to maximize an objective function
W : A → R.
For an action profile a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ A and J ⊆
N , let aJ denote the profile of only the actions of agents
in J . Alternatively, one could think of this as the action
profile where agents not in J choose to opt out. Likewise, we
denote a−i to mean aN\{i} and a−ij to mean aN\{i,j}. With
this notation, we will sometimes write an action profile a as
(ai, a−i) or (aJ , aN\J). Similarly, we may write W (a) as
W (ai, a−i) or as W (aJ , aN\J). Let A−i = Πj 6=iAj denote
the set of possible collective actions of all agents other than
player i.
We denote R(a) ⊆ R as the base set of resources
contained in the action profile a. Then objective function
W is submodular if for all i ∈ N it holds that
W (a)−W (a−i) ≥W (ai, a′−i)−W (a′−i), (1)
for all ai and for all a−i, a′−i ∈ A−i such that R(a−i) ⊆
R(a′−i). In other words, we see a decreased marginal contri-
bution for agent i when other agents choose a−i as opposed
to a′−i. We also say that W is nondecreasing if W (a) ≤
W (a′) for all R(a) ⊆ R(a′), and normalized if W (∅) =
0. In this work, unless otherwise stated, every objective
function W is assumed to be submodular, nondecreasing,
and normalized.
B. Utility Design
A well-studied class of distributed methods for solving
submodular optimization problems relies on tools from game
theory; at a high level, the agents in the optimization problem
are endowed with utility functions which they subsequently
attempt to optimize. Following from [29], a system designer
assigns each agent i a utility function Ui : A → R which will
guide their decision-making process. The designer’s goal is
to select utility functions that combined with an appropriate
learning rule will provably lead the agents to a joint action
profile which is of high quality measured by the system-
level objective W . Note that the utility functions {Ui} may
in general be different from the global objective function
W . A multiagent optimization problem of the above form
is specified by the tuple G = (N,A, {Ui}i∈N ,W ). Thus,
each problem G is a distributed optimization problem with
objective W coupled to a finite game induced by the designed
utility functions {Ui}i∈N .
One utility function that is of note for this work is
marginal contribution (MC), wherein each agent maximizes
its marginal contribution to the objective function W , with
respect to the remaining agents. More formally stated:
MCi(ai, a−i) := W (ai, a−i)−W (∅, a−i). (2)
However, this class of problems admits many other utility
functions as well. In this work we consider utility functions
satisfying the valid utility game assumptions of [15]:
Definition 1: A Valid Utility Game (VUG) is a multiagent
optimization problem satisfying the following three condi-
tions:
1) W is submodular, nondecreasing, and normalized,
2) Ui(a) ≥W (a)−W (∅, a−i)
3)
∑
i Ui(a) ≤W (a)
Note that when W satisfies 1), MC is one possible choice
of utility function that satisfies 2) and 3).
C. Compromised Agents
We extend the standard model described thus far to include
compromised agents of various forms. We begin with the
assumption that G is a VUG, and then some subset of
agents is compromised in a way that limits the amount
of information they have access to, possibly limiting their
decision-making capability. We model this by saying that Ui
is replaced by U˜i for all agents. We consider three ways in
which an agent can be compromised:
1) Blind agents: a blind agent does not know the actions of
any other agents, i.e., if agent i is blind, then U˜i(a) =
Ui(ai, ∅) and U˜j = Uj for j 6= i. We denote the set of
blind agents as B ⊆ N .
2) Isolated agents: an isolated agent is blind, and the other
agents are also blind to it. In other words, if agent i is
isolated, U˜i(a) = Ui(ai, ∅), and U˜j(a) = Uj(a−i) for
j 6= i. We denote the set of isolated agents as I ⊆ N.
3) Disabled agents: a disabled agent i cannot contribute
to system welfare and always selects ai = ∅. The
remaining agents are unaffected: U˜j = Uj for j 6= i.
We denote the set of disabled agents as D ⊆ N .1
We denote K = B ∪ I ∪ D as the set of all compro-
mised agents; note that K may contain any combination
of blind, isolated, and disabled agents. Note that a blind
or isolated agent can still select among its usual actions
and its action choice still contributes to the system ob-
jective W despite the denied observations. We denote a
VUG (N,A, {Ui}i,W ) with compromised agents as G =
(N,A, {Ui}i,W, (B, I,D)). We also denote Gk as the set of
all such games where |K| ≤ k.
For an example of a VUG with compromised agents, see
Figure 1. This example shows that making agents 3, 4, 5 blind
causes agents 3 and 4 to both choose r6, which in turn
decreases W (ane). When 3, 4, 5 are blind and 1, 2 cannot
see their actions (i.e., 3, 4, 5 are isolated), this additionally
causes agent 2 to choose r6, further decreasing W (ane).
Finally, when 3, 4, 5 are disabled, we see that they no longer
contribute to the welfare of the system, which is especially
impactful since r5, the highest-value resource in the game, is
only available to agent 5. While not every problem instance
would degrade in this manner, we shall see in the results
of this paper that this example is indicative of worst-case
behavior.
D. Evaluating a Design: Price of Anarchy
Throughout this paper, we focus on the solution concept of
pure Nash equilibrium so as to abstract away the mechanics
of specific learning rules and algorithms. We define agent
i’s best response set for an action profile a−i ∈ A−i as
Bi(a−i) := arg maxai∈Ai Ui (ai, a−i).
An action profile ane ∈ A is known as a pure Nash
equilibrium if for each agent i,
anei ∈ Bi
(
ane−i
)
. (3)
That is, all agents are best-responding to each other. The set
of pure Nash equilibria of system G is denoted PNE(G).
Accordingly, we measure the effectiveness of a given
utility design by its price of anarchy, comparing the quality
of the Nash equilibria associated with the designed game
against the optimal action profile for that multiagent problem:
PoA (Gk) , inf
G∈Gk
min
a∈PNE(G)
W (a)
max
a∈A(G)
W (a)
∈ [0, 1], (4)
1 Note that for the case of blind or isolated agents, if agent i cannot “see”
the actions of agent j, agent i effectively assumes that agent j is disabled. It
should be noted that assuming disability is merely one possibility and that
optimal modeling of unobservable agents is an open area of research [25].
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(a) A valid utility game where some agents have been compro-
mised. The agents are represented by circles, with the black cross-
hatch agents being compromised. The action set for agent i is
represented by the black lines to boxes, which are resources, i.e.,
the action set for agent i is {{ri}, {r6}}. Each resource rj is
given a value vj in the box next to it. The welfare function
is W (a) =
∑
rj∈R(a) vj , and each agent is endowed with the
marginal contribution utility MCi.
Scenario 𝒂𝟏𝐧𝐞 𝒂𝟐𝐧𝐞 𝒂𝟑𝐧𝐞 𝒂𝟒𝐧𝐞 𝒂𝟓𝐧𝐞 𝑾(𝒂𝐧𝐞)
Optimal 𝑟( 𝑟) 𝑟* 𝑟+ 𝑟, 20
No compromised agents 𝑟- 𝑟) 𝑟* 𝑟( 𝑟, 17
Agents 3,4,5 are blind 𝑟- 𝑟) 𝑟( 𝑟( 𝑟, 15
Agents 3,4,5 are isolated 𝑟- 𝑟( 𝑟( 𝑟( 𝑟, 12
Agents 3,4,5 are disabled 𝑟- 𝑟( ∅ ∅ ∅ 6
(b) Worst-case Nash equilibria (and corresponding evaluations)
under for five scenarios. The first two assume that no agents have
been compromised - note that the optimal allocation is also a NE.
The final three assume that agents 3, 4, 5 have been compromised
in the same way.
Fig. 1: A valid utility game where some agents have been
compromised. We see that making agents 3, 4, 5 blind causes
agents 3 and 4 to both choose r6. When 3, 4, 5 are blind
and 1, 2 cannot see their actions (i.e., 3, 4, 5 are isolated),
this additionally causes agent 2 to choose r6. Finally, when
3, 4, 5 are disabled, we see that they no longer contribute to
the welfare of the system. While not every problem instance
would degrade in this manner, we shall see in the results
of this paper that this example is indicative of worst-case
behavior.
where PNE(G) denotes the set of pure Nash equilibria of
problem G. Note that the closer the price of anarchy is to 1,
the more desirable the system-level performance.
II. EFFECTS OF DENIED OBSERVATIONS ON VALID
UTILITY GAMES
In this work, we demonstrate certain guarantees about the
price of anarchy in a complex system when one or more
agents in the system have been compromised. The effect this
has on the price of anarchy depends somewhat on whether
the agents in the compromised set K are blind, isolated, or
disabled. We now proceed with the result:
Theorem 1: Let G ∈ Gk be a valid utility game satisfying
Definition 1, where agents in K ⊆ N have been compro-
mised with |K| = k. If at least one agent is disabled, then
PoA(Gk) = 0. Otherwise,
PoA(Gk) =
{ 1
2+|K| , if |K| < n− 1,
1
n , if |K| ≥ n− 1.
(5)
Before giving the formal proof, we give a brief overview
and some discussion of the significance of this result. It
should be clear that having a disabled agent can be arbitrarily
bad, thus the PoA of 0 should not be surprising; this is shown
specifically in the proof. In order to show the remaining
cases, we leverage the properties in Definition 1 and the
definitions of blind and isolated agents to give a lower bound
on PoA(Gk). We then consider a subclass of VUGs where
agents are endowed with a Shapley value utility function [6]
as an example to show that the lower bound is tight.
Perhaps unintuitively, blind agents and isolated agents
affect the PoA in the same way; the information provided
to the uncompromised agents by the actions of the blind
agents has no effect. The key deterrent to the PoA is that the
compromised agents do not consider the actions of others,
not that others cannot see the actions of the compromised
agents.
Another way to look at this is to think about a directed
graph (V,E), where each node represents an agent and an
edge (i, j) in the graph means that agent j’s utility function
depends on the action of agent i. In a general sense, one
might expect that the more “connected” the graph, the better
the resulting PoA. Under the nominal setting, where no
agent is compromised, the graph is complete, and we have
PoA(G0) = 1/2. When a single agent i becomes blind, every
edge (j, i) for j 6= i is removed from the graph, but all
edges (i, j) remain. According to Theorem 1, this results in
a decrease in the PoA to PoA(G1) = 1/3. If agent i becomes
isolated, this further removes all edges (i, j) from the graph.
However, Theorem 1 shows that the price of anarchy is
unchanged at PoA(G1) = 1/3.
Proof: First we establish the case where agent i ∈ K
is disabled. Then one could construct an example with W
and ai ∈ Ai such that W (ai, a−i) is arbitrarily large and
W (a−i) = 0 for any a−i. Since agent i is forced to choose
∅, we see that PoA(Gk) = 0.
For the remainder of the proof we assume that all agents in
K are either blind or isolated. In the first case we assume that
|K| < n− 1. We show through the properties of Definition
1 and the definition of blind and isolated agents that 1/(2 +
|K|) is a lower bound on PoA(Gk). Then we show that the
bound is tight by choosing a particular welfare function W
and utility U such that W (ane)/W (aopt) = 1/(2 + |K|).
To see the lower bound, let aopt be an optimal allocation,
i.e., aopt is in the arg max of the denominator in (4). We
also denote aj<i to mean a1, . . . ai−1. Finally, denote Pi =
N \ (I ∪D∪{i}), i.e., Pi is the set of agents whose actions
agent i /∈ K considers in its utility function. Then we see
that
W (aopt) ≤W (aopt, ane) (6)
≤W (ane) +
∑
i
W (aopti , a
opt
j<i, a
ne)−W (aoptj<i, ane) (7)
≤W (ane) +
∑
i
W (aopti , a
ne
Pi)−W (anePi) (8)
≤W (ane) +
∑
i/∈K
Ui(a
opt
i , a
ne
Pi) +
∑
i∈K
W (aopti ) (9)
≤W (ane) +
∑
i/∈K
Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
Pi) +
∑
i∈K
U˜i(a
opt
i ) (10)
≤W (ane) +W (ane) +
∑
i∈K
U˜i(a
ne
i ) (11)
≤W (ane) +W (ane) +
∑
i∈K
W (anei ) (12)
≤(2 + |K|)W (ane), (13)
where (6) is true since W is nondecreasing; (7) is true via
telescoping; (8) is true by submodularity of W ; holds since
the original Ui satisfy 2) in Definition 1 (2nd term), and by
submodularity of W (3rd term); (10) is true by defintion of
NE (2nd term) and by the utlities of the blind and isolated
agents (3rd term); (11) is true since the original Ui satisfy
3) in Definition 1 (2nd term) and by defintion of NE (3rd
term); (12) is true by the defintion of U˜i for agents in K;
and (13) is true since W is nondecreasing.
To see the upper bound, consider a scenario where W is
of the form
W =
∑
r∈R
Wr(|a|r), (14)
where |a|r denotes the number of agents which have se-
lected resource r under allocation a. The functions Wr :
{1, . . . , N} → R are nonnegative, i.e., Wr(i) ≥ 0; non-
decreasing, i.e., Wr(i + 1) ≥ Wr(i); and have decreasing
marginal returns, i.e., Wr(i + 1) −Wr(i) ≥ Wr(i + 2) −
Wr(i + 1). When W has this form, this represents a well-
studied set of games called distributed resource allocation
games (see, for instance [30]).
We also assume that, before agents are compromised, all
are endowed with the equal share (ES) utility, wherein each
agent chooses an action according to the following:
ESi(ai, a−i) =
∑
r∈R(ai)
1
|a|rWr(|a|r), (15)
i.e., when multiple agents choose the same resource, the
agents divide the utility Wr(|a|r) equally. We note that the
ES utility is an instance of the more general Shapley value
utility, also a subject of much study within the literature.
Based on the construction of Wr and therefore W , it
should be clear that W satisfies 1) in Definition 1. Likewise,
it should be immediately clear that when ES is employed,
3) in Definition 1 is satisfied with equality. We can also see
that 2) is satisfied since
W (a)−W (∅, a−i) =
∑
r∈R(ai)
Wr(|a|r)
|a|r −
Wr(|a−i|r)
|a−i|r ,
(16)
Fig. 2: An example game used in the proof for Theorem 1, a VUG
where now a subset of agents K are all blind. Each agent has access
to its own resource (the box closest to it) and a central resource.
The value vr of resource r is the value listed in the box, where
ε, δ > 0 are small, and W (a) =
∑
r∈R(a) vr . We see that the
agents in K will all choose the central resource, since they all act
independently. Agents not in K are endowed with ES, and therefore
are also incentivized to choose the central resource. This implies
W (ane) = 1 and as ε, δ → 0 and n→∞, W (aopt)→ 2 + |K|.
≤
∑
r∈R(ai)
Wr(|a|r)
|a|r (17)
=ECi(a). (18)
Therefore, G = (N,A, {ESi}i,W ), where W has the form
in (14) is a VUG.
Assume that the example shown in Figure 2 is such a
game, where now a subset of agents K are all blind. The
blind agents are represented by the black cross-hatch circles,
and the other agents as blue circles. Each agent has access to
its own resource (the box closest to it) and a central resource.
The value vr of resource r is the value listed in the box,
where ε, δ > 0 are small. Then Wr = vr, i.e., W (a) =∑
r∈R(a) vr. We see that the agents in K will all choose the
central resource, since they all act independently. We also
see that in any NE, all agents not in K are also incentivized
to choose the central resource, since they are endowed with
ES. Therefore, W (ane) = 1. The optimal allocation is for
one agent not in K to choose the central resource and the
remaining agents to choose their alternates, implying that
W (aopt) = 1 + (n − |K| − 1)(1/n − δ) + |K|(1 − ε). As
ε, δ → 0, and n→∞, we see that
W (ane)
W (aopt)
→ 1
2 + |K| . (19)
We now consider the cases when |K| = n − 1, i.e. all
agents are compromised except agent j. The lower bound
on PoA can be seen in the following
W (aopt) =W (aopt, ane−j) (20)
≤W (aoptj ane−j) +W (aopt−j ) (21)
≤W (aopt−j ) + Uj(aoptj , ane−j) +W (aopt−j ) (22)
≤W (aopt−j ) +W (ane)−W (ane−j) +
∑
i
W (aopti )
(23)
Fig. 3: An example game used in the proof for Theorem 2. As
with the other figures, compromised agents are the black cross-
hatch circles and the agents not in K are the blue circles. Each
resource r has a value vr , where W (a) =
∑
r∈R(a vr . A NE
selection yields W (ane) = 1 + ε, since the blue agents have no
other available resources, and the agents in K act independently.
The optimal selection is for the agents in K to choose their alternate
resource, i.e., W (aopt) = |K| + 1 + ε. Therefore, as ε → 0,
W (aopt)→ 1 + |K|.
≤nW (ane) (24)
To see that this is tight, consider the example in Figure 2,
where k = n − 1. We see that W (aopt) = k + 1 − kε =
n− (n− 1)ε. Thus as ε→∞, W (ane)/W (aopt)→ 1/n.
Lastly, suppose that K = N . Then we see that
W (aopt) ≤∑iW (aopti ) ≤∑iW (anei ) = nW (ane), estab-
lishing the lower bound. We see that the bound is tight by
the example from Figure 2, where k = n. Here W (aopt) =
n− nε, and thus as ε→ 0, W (aopt)/W (ane) = 1/n.
III. MARGINAL CONTRIBUTION UTILITY
In this section, we consider the use of the marginal
contribution utility and whether using this specific utility
function design can offset the decrease in PoA that we saw
in Theorem 1. We show that marginal contribution utility can
give a higher PoA in the presence of blind agents. In order
to do so, we define GMCk ⊆ Gk as the subset of games in Gk
which leverage MCi for all agents.
Theorem 2: Let G ∈ GMCk be any valid utility game
which uses the marginal contribution utility, where agents
K ⊆ N are compromised. If one agent is disabled, then
PoA(GMCk ) = 0. Otherwise
PoA(GMCk ) =

1
1+|K| , if |K| < n− 1 and |B| > 0,
1
2+|K| , if |K| < n− 1 and |B| = 0,
1
n , if |K| ≥ n− 1.
(25)
Proof: We note that the values for PoA(Gk) shown in
Theorem 1 are lower bounds for PoA(GMCk ). Therefore, we
need only show that having one blind agent increases the
lower bound for PoA(GMCk ), then show that all these lower
bounds are tight.
As with Theorem 1, we use submodularity and monotonic-
ity to show that when |B| > 0, PoA(GMCk ) ≥ 11+|K| , and
then proceed to provide a canonical example to show that
this lower bound on PoA is tight. As a matter of notation,
for a, b ∈ A, we denote W (a, b) to mean W (c), where
c = {ai ∪ bi}i. Futhermore, for some J ⊆ N , we use aJ to
mean {ai}i∈J .
To see the lower bound, suppose that B 6= ∅ and consider
the following:
W (aopt) ≤W (aopt, aneB ) , (26)
≤W
(
aoptN\K , a
ne
B
)
+
∑
i∈K
W
(
aopti
)
, (27)
=W
(
aoptN\K , a
ne
B
)
+
∑
i∈K
W (anei ) , (28)
≤W
(
aoptN\K , a
ne
B
)
+W (aneB ) + (|K| − 1)W (ane)
(29)
where (26) is true by monotonicity, (27) is true by submod-
ularity, (28) is true since agents in K are either blind or
isolated, and (29) is true by monotonicity.
Once an agent in K has chosen an action, that agent
has no incentive to deviate, regardless of how the other
agents behave. Therefore, we can consider a “sub game”
G¯ = (N \K, A¯,MC,W ) among only the non-compromised
agents, assuming that the blind and isolated agents have made
their choices. In this sub game, the non-compromised agents
seek to maximize the welfare function W : A¯i → R, where
A¯ := Πi/∈KAi, such that
W (a¯) = W (a¯, aneB )−W (aneB ), (30)
for a¯ ∈ A¯i. Note that W is also submodular monotone, with
W (∅) = 0. The agents are endowed with the following utility
function
MCi(a¯i, a¯−i) = W (a¯i, a¯−i)−W (a¯−i). (31)
It can be easily shown that is a VUD. Therefore, we
know from [15] that 2W (a¯ne) ≥ W (a¯opt), where
a¯opt ∈ arg maxa¯W (a). It is also important to note that by
design, a¯ne is also a NE profile of actions for agents not
in K for the original game G, assuming that agents in B
choose aneB .
Returning to (29), we see that
W (aopt) ≤W
(
aoptN\K , a
ne
B
)
−W (aneB )
+ 2W (aneB ) + (|K| − 1)W (ane) (32)
=W
(
aoptN\K
)
+ 2W (aneB ) + (|K| − 1)W (ane) (33)
≤W (a¯opt)+ 2W (aneB ) + (|K| − 1)W (ane) (34)
≤2W (a¯ne) + 2W (aneB ) + (|K| − 1)W (ane) (35)
=2W
(
aneN\K , a
ne
B
)
+ (|K| − 1)W (aneK ) (36)
≤(1 + |K|)W (ane), (37)
where (32) is trivially true, (33) is true by defintion of W ,
(34) is true by definition of a¯opt, (35) is true since G¯ is a
VUG, (36) is true by definition of W , and (37) is true by
Fig. 4: An example game used in the proof for Theorem 2, for
the case where K is only isolated agents. We use the same W
and notation as Figure 3, except with different resource values
and action sets. As with previous examples, agents in K act
independently, choosing the two 1+ ε resources. The agents not in
K are not informed of these decisions, so a worst-case NE is where
the two agents which also have access to these two resources also
select them. The remaining agents not in K have only access to one
ε resource. Therefore, in this case, W (ane) = 2+3ε. The optimal
allocation, on the other hand, is for all resources to be selected.
Thus as ε→ 0, W (ane)/W (aopt)→ 1/(2 + |K|).
monotonicity. Thus for any G that meets the requirements
of the theorem statement, and for any ane, it follows that
W (ane)
W (aopt)
≥ 1
1 + |K| , (38)
implying that this is also a lower bound for PoA(MC,K).
We now show that the lower bounds established above
are tight. First consider the problem instance in Figure 3.
Again, compromised agents are the black cross-hatch circles
and the agents not in K are the blue circles. As with the other
examples in this paper, each resource r has a value vr, where
W (a) =
∑
r∈R(a vr. It should be clear that a NE selection
yields W (ane) = 1 + ε, since the blue agents have no other
available resources, and the agents in K act independently.
The optimal selection is for the agents in K to choose their
alternate resource, i.e., W (aopt) = |K| + 1 + ε. Therefore,
as ε→ 0, we see that
W (ane)
W (aopt)
→ 1
1 + |K| . (39)
Note that this holds for any combination of isolated and blind
agents in K, and as long as |K| < n.
In the case where K = N , then in the example in Figure
3 one agent will still choose the 1 +ε resource. Here we see
that as ε→ 0, W (ane)/W (aopt)→ 1/n.
In the case where |K| < n − 1 and there are no blind
agents in K, we invoke the example in Figure 4, which
uses the same W and notation as Figure 3, except with
different resource values and action sets. As with previous
examples, agents in K act independently, choosing the two
1 + ε resources. The agents not in K are not informed of
these decisions, so a worst-case NE is where the two agents
which also have access to these two resources also select
Fig. 5: An instance of a VUG with compromised agents, using
the same style of example as in Figure 5, except that the alternate
resource for agents not in K is of value ε, and for the specific
instance where |K| = n − 1. Every agent in K is either blind
or isolated, so each acts independently. The one agent not in K
is endowed with the MC utility. This example is used for the
simulations in Section IV.
them. The remaining agents not in K have only access to
one ε resource. Therefore, in this case, W (ane) = 2 + 3ε.
The optimal allocation, on the other hand, is for all resources
to be selected. Thus as ε→ 0,
W (ane)
W (aopt)
→ 1
2 + |K| . (40)
IV. SIMULATION
In this section we present empirical findings from the
results of running a simulation of stochastic learning dy-
namics applied to a VUG in which agents are endowed
with a marginal contribution utility function. We simulate the
popular log-linear learning dynamics [11], [31] to validate
the results and explore the effect of “noisy” behavior on
these low-quality equilibria. Log-linear learning operates in
discrete steps at times t = 0, 1, . . . , producing a sequence of
joint actions a(0), a(1), . . . . We assume agents begin with an
arbitrary joint action a(0) ∈ A, and let a(t) = (ai, a−i) ∈ A.
At time t ∈ N, agent i ∈ N is selected uniformly at random
to update its action for time t + 1; all other agents’ actions
will remain fixed for time t+1. At time t+1, agent i chooses
action ai ∈ Ai with probability
paii (t+ 1) =
eUi(ai,a−i(t))/T∑
a˜i∈Ai e
Ui(a˜i,a−i(t))/T
. (41)
“Temperature” parameter T > 0 dictates an updating agent’s
degree of rationality and is identical for all agents i ∈ N .
As T → 0, agents are increasingly likely to select utility-
maximizing actions, and as T → ∞, agents tend to choose
their next actions uniformly at random. The joint action at
time t+ 1 is a(t+ 1) = (ai(t+ 1), a−i(t)).
After the agent has selected an action, the value of the
welfare function, W (a), is computed. For each discrete value
of temperature, 200,000 iterations of such selections are
(a) Simulations with temperatures ranging from 0.001 to 0.016.
(b) Simulations with temperatures ranging from 0.001 to 10.
Fig. 6: Plots representing simulation results of the game shown in
Figure 5 with n = 10, |K| = 9, and ε = 0.05. For each trace, log-
linear learning is run for 200,000 iterations for each temperature
value. The solid blue trace corresponds to all agents in K being
blind, and the dashed red trace corresponds to all agents in K being
isolated. Note that for very low temperatures (effectively the agents
are playing asynchronous best-response dynamics), blindness has a
slight advantage over isolation in accordance with Theorem 2.
performed. The average value of the welfare function across
these iterations is then computed and plotted across a range
of temperature in Figures 6a and 6b.
We run log-linear learning on the game depicted in Fig-
ure 5 with n = 10, |K| = 9, and ε = 0.05, and these results
closely approximate the relationship detailed in Theorem 2.
The difference in the average value of the welfare function
in a game in which all the compromised agents are isolated
versus one in which at least one of these agents is blind can
be seen in Figure 6a. The compromised agents in K are all
blind in the first simulation (solid blue trace in 6a), and all
are isolated in the second (dashed red trace in 6a). Agents
have access to two resources. The first resource has a payoff
of 1 and is common to all agents in the system. Each agent
also has access to a second resource that is accessible only
by that agent. For the compromised agents, the payoff of the
second resource is 1− ε. For the remaining uncompromised
agent, this payoff value is ε.
For this game, since a value of 0.05 was selected for
epsilon, the optimal selection of resources yields a value of
the welfare function of 9.55. The Nash equilibrium yields a
value of 1 when all agents in K are isolated, and 1.05 when
at least one agent in K is blind.
In the simulation, the game in which all the agents were
blind had a minimum average value of the welfare function
of 1.050015, hence the price of anarchy is 0.10995. The
game in which all the agents were isolated had an minimum
average value of welfare function of 1.000034, giving a price
of anarchy of 0.1047. These values of the price of anarchy
differ slightly from those given by Theorem 2 due to the use
of a non-zero value of ε.
A purely uniformly random strategy yields an expected
value of 5.35. As temperature increases, the instability of the
Nash equilibrium becomes apparent, and the average of the
welfare function increases with an increase in temperature
until this value is indistinguishable from that produced by a
purely random strategy as seen in Figure 6b.
An intriguing aspect of this example is that the Nash
equilibrium, representing a worst-possible Nash equilibrium
in the class of games GMC9 , is actually among the worst action
profiles in the game. Hence, a large value of T (i.e., agents
selecting actions uniformly at random) results in play that is
of far higher quality than the Nash equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents new results regarding the robustness
of valid utility games to lost or denied information transfer
among agents, and illustrates that in a broad array of submod-
ular maximization games, performance guarantees degrade
gracefully with the degree of information denial. Our results
also show a variety of intriguing phenomena, such as the
notion that isolation is no worse than blindness in worst
case and that marginal-contribution utility functions provably
outperform the baseline performance guarantees. Many open
questions remain, including that of which utility functions
are optimal in this context and how arbitrary unstructured
information losses impact performance guarantees.
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